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Wiretapping-The Right of Privacy versus the Public Interest
Wiretapping, a method of secretly listening to telephone conversations
through perfected mechanical apparatus,' has been subject to attack in
recent years as a violation of the right to privacy.2 In states where the
possession of wiretapping equipment is not limited, its possible use for
blackmail and business espionage purposes is obvious.3 Even where
only police officers may possess this equipment, the necessities of law
enforcement may not counter-balance the danger to privacy. Wiretap-
ping is not the work of a day; it is usually carried on for weeks, some-
times months, on the telephones of various people, many of whom are
innocent of any offense.4 In New York the greatest number of convic-
tions from wiretapped evidence are misdemeanors ("bookie rackets"
and "vice rings") ; it is sometimes felt, therefore, that the value of law
enforcement in this type of offense is not commensurate with the danger
to privacy. 5 Thus wiretapping is said to be a "dirty business" 6 and a
"disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet."'7
Despite these criticisms, wiretapping has been permitted in those
states where strict enforcement of the criminal law is considered more
I For a discussion of the mechanics of wire tapping, see N. Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1948,
p. 17, col. 2.
2 Jones v.. Herald.Post Co., 230 N. Y. 227, 18 S.W. (2d) 972, (1922) where the
court said, "the right of privacy is the right to live one's life in seclusion, without
being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. In short, it is the right to
be let alone." Accord, Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W. (2d) 46 (1931);
Comment (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 297.
3 N. Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1948, p. 51, Col. 1: "For example, a lawyer may be curious
about what a prospective court opponent is up to. A politician may be interested
in a rival's plans. Or a man might listen in on another person's private life in the
hope of obtaining juicy items with sales value-to give it the nasty name-for
blackmail. " I
4Ibid: 'If a tapper waits long enough he can piece together a lead here and
there--not enough, perhaps, to make worth-while evidence in court, but enough to
lead police to places where evidence can be found." In Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438 (1938), six agents tapped for nearly five months before they secured
sufficient evidence.
5165 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1917). N. Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1948, col. 1: "An estimated
75 to 90% of the authorized taps ... are in cages of prostitution 4nd bookmaking."
6 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928). Holmes, J., dissenting:
"no distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Govern-
ment as judge. If the existing .Code does not permit district attorneys to have a
hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to
succeed."
7 Ibid at 473, Brandeis, J., dissenting: "Subtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than stretch-
ing upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet."
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important than the violation of privacy.8 They argue that the use of
the telephone is not a guarantee of privacy, as it carries messages over
outlets peculiarly susceptible to wiretapping, the risk of interception is
assumed.9 Since the police only tap the wires of suspects, the danger to
the privacy of innocent persons is more imagined than real. Moreover,
eavesdropping,10 the use of disguises by an officer posing as a member of
a criminal gang," and the concealment of a microphone in a room,12 all
clear violations of the right of privacy, are permitted. There is no sub-
stantial distinction between wiretapping and these other invasions of
privacy. Why then prohibit only the one device ?
Comparison of these views indicates that, in the final analysis, the
issue is the relative value of privacy and investigative efficiency. The
conflict of values may be seen in the private remedies available, the rules
concerning the admissibility of such evidence, and the proposed Con-
gressional solution to the problem.
Prtivate Remedies
In situations where wiretapping is thought to be undesirable, there are
private tort remedies available.' 3 In some jurisdictions actual damage
8 The greater number of states have provisions aimed specifically at wire tapping.
See: Ala. Code, tit. 14, §84 (18) (1940); Ark. Dig. Stat. §14255 (Pope, 1937); Colo.
Ann. Stat. §129 (Michie,'1935); Conn. Gen. Stat. §6148 (1930); I11. Rev. Stat., e.
134, §16 (Smith-Hurd, 1936) ; Iowa Code §13121 (Reichmann, 1939) ; Han. Gen. Stat.
§17-1908 (Corrick, 1935); Ky. Rev. Stat. §433.430 (Cullen, 1946); La. Code Crim.
Law & Proc. §1183 (Dart, 1943); Mass. Ann. Laws, e. 272, §99 (Michie, 1933); Neb.
Rev. Stat. §86-328 (1943); N. M. Stat. Ann. §41-3705 (1929); N. C. Gen. Stat.
§140155 (Michie, 1943); Tenn. Code §10863 (Michie, 1938); Va. Code §4477 (Michie,
1942); Wash. Rev. Stat. Anm. §2656 (18) (Remington, 1932); Wis. Stat. §348.37
(Brossard, 1945).
The following states prohibit wire tapping as well as divulgence: Ariz. Code
§43-5405 (1939) ; Cal. Pen. Code §591, 619, 640 (Derring, 1940) ; Del. Rev. Code 5232,
§52 (1935); Fla. Stat. Ann. §822.10 (1944); Idaho Code §17-4505 (1932); Mich.
Stat. Ann. §28.808 (Henderson, 1938).; Mont. Rev. Code §11518 (Anderson & McFar-
land, 1935); Nev. Comp. Laws §7680 (Hillyer, 1929); X. J. Stat. Ann. §2:171-1
(1939); N.D. Comp. Laws §10231 (1913); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. §13402 (Page,
1939); Okla. Stat. §1782 (1941); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. §510 (1940); Pa. Stat. Ann.
§4688 (Purdon, 1939); R. L Gen. Laws e. 609, §73 (1938); S.D. Code §13.4511
(1939); Utah Code Ann. §103-46-11 (1943); Wyo. Gen. Stat. §32-356 (Courtright,
1931).
9 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) "By the invention of the
telephone fifty years ago, and its application for the purpose of extending communi-
cations, one can talk with another ,at a far distant place . . . the" intervening wires
are not part of his house or office any more than are the highways along which they
are stretched."
10 United States v. Harnish, 7 F. Supp. 305 (D.C. N.D., 1934) (radio direction
finder) ; People v. Cotts, 49 Cal. 166 (1874) (police officer listened to conversation in
defendant's cell); Goode v. State, 158 Miss. 616; 131- So. 107 (1930) (sheriff over-
heard conversation from road) ; Hunter v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. App. 252, 12 S. W. (2d)
566 (1928) (police listened at window).
11 Note (1946) 32 Cornell Law Quarterly 514
12 Schoborg v. United States, 264 F. 1 (C.C.. 6th, 1920) (dietograph); People v.
Schultz, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 485, 64 P. (2d) 440 (1937) (dictaphone) ; United States
v. Goldman, 118 F. (2d) 310 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) (planting detectaphone in room);
Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918) (conversation in
defendant's cell overheard by dictograph).
i The common law provides actions for damages against the searching officer.
Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390, 11 S. W. 223 (1935) ; Doane v. Anderson, 15 N.Y.
Supp. 459 (1911); Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Priest, 31 Tex. Civ.
App. 345, 72 S. W. 241 (1903) ; Young v. Young, 56 R.I. 401, 185 AtI. 901 (1936)
(court stated that no part of the wire was destroyed, the free transmission of the
messages was preserved, and the communication was not distorted).
1949]
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to property must be shown as in an action for trespass. This is hard to
prove, however, for wiretapping ordinarily does not result in property
damage.14 Punitive damages are also available, but they are usually
based on malice which would be difficult to show in the case of an officer' 5 .
Even if substantial damages for humiliation and mental anguish were
ascertained,'8 they would be difficult to recover against a municipality
which is usually not liable in tort without its consent, when acting under
the police power.' 7 Where the offender is not an officer, full recovery
is allowed subject to the actual and punitive damage rules of each
jurisdiction.
If an individual knows that his wires are being tapped, he may seek
to have such practices enjoined in the future. Since the success of wire-
tapping is dependent on secrecy, however, this opportunity will seldom
occur. The problem of injunctive relief from wiretapping only arises
where law enforcement officials are permitted to engage in this prac-
tice, the key to the availability of this rem*edy being "reasonable
cause."' 8 Unless such cause can be shown, equity will enjoin continued
tapping by officials. Where such cause is shown, however, equity will pre-
fer to await the outcome by saying that the remedy at law, damages for
the invasion of privacy, is adequate. In the jurisdictions favoring strict
enforcement of the criminal law, therefore, it is to be expected that
injunctive relief would be extremely difficult to obtain.
Admissibility as Evidence
Although private remedies seek to protect the right of privacy and
furnish some deterrent force to indiscriminate tapping, the most crucial
question is raised when information so gained is offered in evidence.
Under the common law rule of admissibility, the judge will not delay
the trial to determine the collateral issue of its legality.'9 The opponents
14 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) Murphy, T., dissenting: "in a trespass
action the measure of damages is simply the extent of the injury to physical property
... if the officer searches with care, he can avoid all but nominal damages."
15Id. at 43, 4643; 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1931), Pay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342
(1872); Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 Pac. 639 (1929); McCormick, Damages,
(1935) §78.
16 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1920) where the court said,
"He is entitled to recover substantial damages, although the only damages suffered
by him resulted from mental anguish. The fact that the damages cannot be measured
by a pecuniary standard is not a bar to his recovery." Accord, Rhodes v. Graham,
238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931) ; Gatzner v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. 1003
(1900); McCormick, Damages, (1935) §88.
17 The categorial rule, subject to many limitations, is that municipalities are not
liable for the acts of their officers and employees when engaged in the performance
of governmental or public duties, Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.
(2d) 1152 (1937); Snook v. City of Winfield, 144 Kan. 375, 61 P. (2d) 101 (1936),
but are liable for their acts when performing duties consequent upon the exercise of
the corporate or private powers, Hannon v. City of Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 136
Atl. 876 (1927); City of Baltimore v. State, 168 Md. 619, 179 Atl. 169 (1935);
Husband v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah 449, 69 P." (2d) 491 (1937). "
18 New York Rev. Const., Art. I, §12 (1938). "The right of the people to be se-
cure against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communication
shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or
affirmation that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may
be thus obtained."
19 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (12th ed. 1941) §254(a) "though papers and other sub-
jects of evidence may have been illegally taken from the possession of the party
against whom they are offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is no valid
[Vol. 40
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of wire tapping have, therefore, endeavored to apply the Federal Rule2 0
of exclusion to this kind of evidence.
In Olmstead v. United States,2 ' an attempt was made to declare wire-
tapping a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Taft, speak-
ing for a divided Court, said that wiretapping was neither a "search nor
seizure" and since there was no trespass or taking of papers and effects,
evidence obtained by the "sense of hearing only" would not be pro-
hibited.2 2 The history of the Fourth Amendment shows that it was
intended to protect the right of privacy, and telephone messages would
seem as deserving of protection as letters or papers. The Court, how-
ever, preferred to construe the amendment strictly, leaving further
determination of the question of legality to Congress.23
In 1934 Congress enacted, as Section 605 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act, a provision which prohibited the interception of "any com-
munication" and divulgence of messages to any party not entitled thereto
unless authorized by the sender.24 Under that section, the Supreme
Court, in Nardone v. United States,25 rejected evidence exposing a smug-
gling ring because it was secured by wiretapping, an unauthorized inter-
ception. Although the legislative history of this section indicates that
its primary purpose was to amend Section 27 of the Radio Act, extending
the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission to wire
messages, 26 the Court was willing to recognize a possible subsidiary inten-
tion to discourage wiretapping which it alleged was "inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty."
2 7
A further objection to the application of Section 605 to wiretapping
was the contention that it only prohibited tapping on interstate com-
munications. In Sabalowsky v. United States,2 8 violators of the tax law
on spirits were apprehended by federal agents who had secured evidence
objection to their admissibility, if they are pertinent to the issue. The court will
not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it
form an issue, to determine that question." 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940)
§2183. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904).
20 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) the United States marshall
took papers from the defendant's house without a warrant. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction saying that the admission of such evidence, when timely
application has been made for its return, would constitute an invasion of defendant's
rights under the Fourth Amendment. The rule requiring a preliminary motion to
supress illegally seized evidence has become known as the Federal Rule.
21277 U.S. 438 (1928).
22 Id. at 440. 'The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was
no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the
sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants. " I
23 Id. at 453. "Congress may of course protect the secrecy. of telephone messages
by making them, where intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials,
by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence."
2448 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 USCA §605 (Supp. 1946).. "and no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person..."
25 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (Petitioners were charged with smuggling of alcohol, pos-
session and concealment of the smuggled alcohol, and conspiracy to smuggle and
conceal it).
26 44 Stat. 1172 (1927).
27 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937). "Congress may have thought it less important that
some offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to
methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal
.liberty."
28 101 F. (2d) 183 (C.C.A. 3d 1938).
1949]
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by wiretapping. Both the violations and the wire taps occurred in New
York. Counsel for the Government contended that by the first and third
clauses of Section 605, only tapping of interstate communications'was
prohibited.2 9 The court replied that while the first and third clauses
refer to "interstate or foreign communications" they are intended to
include only telegraph companies and their employees; the second and
fourth clauses, being unrestricted, prohibit all intercepted communica-
tions. This is logical because of the practical impossibility of separating
the two types when an agent is listening in on an instrumentality of
interstate commerce.
When the Nardone case reached the Supreme Court a second time,
Justice Frankfurter extended the statute to exclude any derivative use
of "wiretapped evidence."8 0 The application of the federal rule31 of
exclusion in this case was necessary to prevent a circumvention of the
statutory policy.
The broad rule declaring that evidence obtained by violation of Sec-
tion 605 is inadmissible has been subject to certain limitations since the
decisions in the two Nardone cases. The prohibition of the section is not
absolute in itself, but is a personal privilege available only to the sender.
In Goldstein v. 'United States,32 federal agents tapped the wires of cer-
tain persons suspected of defrauding insurance companies by fake
claims for disability benefits. The information obtained did not come
from tapping the wires of the accused; instead it was secured by taps
on the wires of his confederates. The agents, informing certain members
of the conspiracy of this evidence, persuaded them to turn Government's
witnesses by a promise of immunity from prosecution. The accused in-
voked Section 605 which was held inapplicable since he was not a party
to the wire tapped communications. This is a departure from the pro-
hibitive policy of the previous cases and shows that the Court may not
be unwilling to adopt a construction of the section that will admit "wire-
tapped evidence."
Since the section confers a personal privilege on the sender, it may be
waived by his consent. By this means, in United States v. Polalcoff,33 a
further inroad on the rule of the Nardone cases was attempted. A con-
spirator who was involved in a smuggling ring reported its activities to
federal agents. Under a carefully devised plan, he telephoned his co-
conspirators from the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation whose
agents recorded the conversation. Counsel for the goyernment alleged
that the "sender" authorized divulgened of the message. The Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, held that in a telephone conversation each
party is alternately sender and receiver and it would be impossible to
29 Id. at 185. "The first and third clauses of the section deal with employees of
communication agencies. The second and fourth clauses constitute a rule of evidence
in the purest sense . . . . Congress in Section 605 prohibited intrastate as well as
interstate communications in a district court of the United States." Diamond v.
United States, 108 F. (2d) 859 (C.C.A. 6th 1938); United States v. Xlee, 101 P.
(2d) 191 (C.C.A. 3d 1938); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
30 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). "The burden, is of course, on the accused in the
first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire tapping was unlaw-
fully employed. Once that is established . . . the trial judge must give" opportunity,
hoivever closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the
case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to
the government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin."
31 See note 20 supra.
32 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
33 112 P. (2d) 888 (C.C.A. 2d 1940).
[Vol. 40
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dissect a conversation so that one party could consent without destroying
the other's privilege. Thus the waiver exception to the Nardone case,
though recognized, is limited to mutual consent, thereby depriving it of
any practical *effect.
Even with its limitations, the statute is a remedy against a practice
considered to be "unethical" but the question is whether it applies to
state courts. In those states which follow the common law rule of admis-
sibility of evidence, 34 the attempt to apply the statute to them under the
force of the Fourteenth Anendment has been a failure. Even though
the Fourth Amendment has now been read into the Fourteenth, 5 wire-
tapping cannot be called an "unreasonable search and seizure" because
the Olmstead case is still good law.36
It may be argued that the second clause of Section 605 providing that
"no person... shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
... to any person... 37 prohibits wire tapped evidence in state courts
in the same manner in which it is forbidden in federal courts.88 Failure
to so construe the section would practically nullify- its protection of
privacy'since the bulk of criminal prosecutions occur in state courts and
many criminal offenses, usually prosecuted in federal courts, could, by
technical changes in the indictments, be prosecuted in state courts.8 9
This argument is opposed by the states, who claim that Congress cannot
constitutionally impose restrictions on their procedure, and that they
have traditionally been free to make their own rules of evidence, provid-
ing the accused is given a fair and impartial trial.40
Congress, however, has the power to prohibit such evidence in the
state courts by means of the commerce clause on the ground that, in
order to protect interstate commerce, the part of intrastate commerce
relating thereto can be regulated.41 Precedent for Federal invasion of
84 See note 19 supra.
85 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Justice Frankfurter replied, " the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
states through the Due Process clause."
36 See note 22 supra. Olnstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949). The court reasoned that the Federal Rule is the creation of the
judiciary and need not be followed by the states even where an unreasonable search
and seizure is involved.
8748 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 USCA §605 (Supp. 1946).
88 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 370 (1937). The Supreme Court held that
the second clause of §605, cited supra note 24, comprehends federal agents and the
ban on communication bars testimony to the content of an intercepted message.
Accord, Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Goldstein v. United States,
316 U.S. 114 (1942).
89 Note (1947) 33 Cornell Law Quarterly 73.
40 People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. (2d) 169, 137 P. (2d) 1 (1943) appeal dismissed sub.
nom. Kelley v. State, 320 U.S. 715 (1944). The Court said, "Section 606 was in-
tended for the activities of officials and courts of the federal government and for
no others. In matters involving solely procedure, state courts are not effeeted by
acts of Congress." Accord, People v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal. (2d) 193, 137 P. (2d) 437
(1943); Rowan v. Maryland, 175 Md. 547, 3 A. (2d) 753 (1938); note (1941)
25 Minn. L. Rev. 382; Note (1943) 18 N.C.L. Rev. 222.
41 Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (in a civil action
to recover penalties for violation of Safety Appliance Act, the court applied the
commerce clause to control intrastate traffic having a direct effect on interstate
traffic). The court said, "interstate traffic ... will be promoted in a real or sub-
stantial sense by applying the requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving
the traffic which is intrastate." Accord, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States,
234 U.S. 342 (1914); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
1949]
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state court procedure exists in the provision in the Bankruptcy Act that
no testimony by the bankrupt shall be used against him in any criminal
proceeding, 42 and the use of the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution to compel state courts to enforce claims under the Emer-
gency Price Control Act.43 This question, however, has not yet been
determined and as a result there has been a wide variation among the
states that follow the statute and those that do not.
44
Thus the passage of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act
has not solved the problem. The limitations which have been placed
around the statute and its uncertain applicability to the states, have left
a considerable degree of variation in the judicial and legislative attitudes
toward wiretapping. It is still not certain how far courts should go in
excluding evidence of crimes nor is there a clear concept of the privacy
of the telephone. As a result, legislators, judges, lawyers, and laymen
are asking: at what point, if any, does the end begin to justify a "dirty"
means?
Legislative Proposals
The answer to this question is reflected in the recently proposed legis-
lation amending Section 605. The bill allows wiretapping in cases con-
cerning national security and defense.45 Treason, sabotage, espionage,
violation of neutrality laws and others are specifically enumerated, and
under the comprehensive phrase, "in any other manner," all crimes
affecting national security are intended to be included.46 This limitation
of the subject matter of wiretapping eliminates the criticism that tap-
ping has its major use in relatively unimportant cases.47 Under this
statute, only national security is considered to be paramount to the right
of privacy.
The right to "tap" is further limited to the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Intelligence Division
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.4 8 Since the indiscriminate use of
wiretapping is a fertile source of blackmail and sinister business prac-
tices, the possession of wiretapping equipment by anyone, with intent
to use it or knowing it will be used in violation of the Act, is a felony.49
42 30 Stat. 548 (1898), amended 52 Stat. 847 (1939), 11 USC §25 (a) (1940).
43 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947) where the court said, "cit repudiated
the assumption that federal laws can be considered by the states as though they
were laws emanating from a foreign sovereign. Its teaching is that the Constitution
and the laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike
upon states, courts, and the people, 'anything in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.'"
44 See note 8 supra.
45 HMI. Rep. No. 4124, 81st Cong., 1st Seas. (1949) 2. "to ascertain, prevent, ....
any interference ... with the national security and defense ... and to require that
... any information obtained by means bf intercepting, listening in on, or recording
telephone ... be disclosed and delivered to any -authorized agent of any one of said
investigatorial agencies, without regard to the limitations contained in section 605
of the Communication Act of 1934. The information thus obtained sall be admissible
in evidence .. ."
46Id. at 3. "(Treason, sabotage, espionage, seditious conspiracy, violation of neu-
trality laws,... or in any other manner .. 22
47 See note 5 supra.
48 HXR. Rep. No. 4124, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) 2.
49 Id. at 2. "No person shall possess any device, contrivance, machine, ... used
for the interception of wire communications .. .any person who wilfully violates
any provision of this section shall be guilty of a felony .. ." To the same effect
is N.Y. Penal Law, §552 (a) (1949).
[Vol. 40
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Even the ordinary officer, intent on enforcing the law, cannot tap, so
great is the protection to the right of privacy.
Securing permission to tap is the most uncertain provision in the pro-
posed law. The initial proposal in the House of Representatives recom-
mended that permission to tap be secured from any federal court on a
showing of probable cause ;50 the recommendation of April 6th suggests
the use of a warrant, adopting the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment,51 while the latest proposal requires the duly authorized agents of
the various departments to act under rules and regulations prescribed
by the Attorney General.52 The common element of all three proposals
is the necessity to show reasonable cause to believe that an injury to
national security will occur if permission is not granted. Either pro-
posal is designed to meet this need; the difference being that the latest
one eliminates the time consumed in securing a warrant or permit and,
provides greater convenience and efficiency in investigation.
CJonclusion
The battle between administrative efficiency and the right of privacy
has been renewed in Congress, apparently with a trend away from the
wide protection given to the right of privacy by Section 605. Regardless
of the merits of the proposed line which would place only the interest in
the national security above the interest of the citizen in the secrecy of
his telephone conversations, Congressional action in this field seems
highly desirable since the courts are apparently willing to 16t the matter
rest with the Olmstwd case and thus avoid the, issue of whether or not
the Federal legislation can, by implication, control the rules of evidence
in state courts. This legislative proposal does have the merit of imposing
a uniform rule, attacldng such evidence at its source instead of the point
at which it is offered in court.
The principal area of contention at the present time is the mechanism
by which wiretapping will be restricted to eases in which the national
security is probably involved. The current proposal, that the practice
be regulated under rules prescribed by the Attorney General, suggests
a concession to administrative efficiency and expediency. The considera-
tions involved here are the need for absolute secrecy as against the safety
of a judicial hearing. Whatever the decision on that point, federal officers
will be permitted greater latitude than they now have and the indis-
criminate use of wiretapping in relatively unimportant situations will
be further curtailed. Thus the present legislation represents certain
concessions to each side but no final opinion as to the relative value of
the policies, advocated.
FERiNAND J. ZENo, JR.
5o H.R. Rep. No. 3563, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) 3. "A judge of any United
States court shall issue a permit,... if the judge is satisfied that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the communications may contain information which would
assist in the conduct of such investigations,
51 H.R. Rep. No. 4048, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) 3. "the prohibition of this
subsection shall not apply if such interception is authorized by a warrant.., issued
by a judge of the United States . . . upon an affidavit sworn to before the judge
... that there is probable cause to so believe ... '
52 H.R. Rep. No. 4124, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) 3.
19491
